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Recent Decisions
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY-The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the presumed legitimacy
of a child born during coverture of marriage can be rebutted by the
testimony of its mother and her former husband when she and the
actual father of the child are married subsequent to the child's birth.
Commonwealth ex. rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 254 A.2d 306
(1968).
Andree MacFarland Leider, the prosecutrix, married MacFarland
in 1946 and they lived together until their separation in 1956. In
1960, she met the defendant and they began living together as husband
and wife the following year. The prosecutrix gave birth to a child in
1962. On January 18, 1963, the prosecutrix and MacFarland were di-
vorced and nine days later she married the defendant. A divorce was
subsequently obtained by the prosecutrix from Leider and this suit was
brought against him to obtain support for her child.
The trial court admitted the testimony of the prosecutrix and Mac-
Farland as to their non-access to one another from the time of their
separation to their divorce in 1963. On the basis of this evidence, the
court found that the presumption of legitimacy had been successfully
rebutted in that their testimony presented "[c]lear, direct, satisfactory
and irrefragable proof to the contrary"1 and ordered support payments
to be made by the defendant.
On appeal, the superior court reversed 2 and held that permitting
MacFarland and the prosecutrix to testify as to non-access constituted
error. In reviewing this holding, the supreme court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones, found that neither the presumption of legitimacy
nor the non-access rule were applicable and reversed the order of the
superior court. Mr. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion attacked
the existence of the artificial non-access rule. In calling for the court
to completely abandon it, Mr. Justice Roberts stressed the uselessness
of the non-access rule as reflected by the enlightened status accorded
the illegitimate in our laws and he explicitly stated that he would have
admitted the evidence as to non-access regardless of whether Leider had
subsequently married the child's mother.
In dissenting, Mr. Chief Justice Bell criticized the majority of the
court for creating an exception to the non-access rule and viewed their
1. Thorn Estate, 353 Pa. 603, 606, 46 A.2d 258, 260 (1946).
2. Commonwealth ex. rel. Leider v. Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 433, 233 A.2d 917 (1967).
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action as effectively overruling it. In calling for the reaffirmation of the
non-access rule, Mr. Chief Justice Bell based his demand upon the
long established public policy of protecting the legitimacy of children.
In Pennsylvania, a child born during coverture of marriage is pre-
sumed to be legitimate.3 This presumption of legitimacy witnessed the
development of the correlative non-access rule which makes the mother
of a child and her husband incompetent to testify as to the absence of
sexual relations between them when such testimony would in effect
bastardize the child.
For reasons of public policy it has been the law for centuries that
there is a tremendously strong presumption that children are le-
gitimate. . . . In order to successfully rebut the presumption of
legitimacy, the evidence of non-access or lack of sexual intercourse
or impotency must be clear, direct, convincing, and unanswer-
able.... Moreover, our public policy is so firmly established and
so strong that the courts have declared that "non-access cannot be
testified to by either the husband or wife in order to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy." 4
The origin of the non-access rule stems from an opinion rendered
by Lord Mansfield in an ejectment action." In that action he stated:
As to time of birth, the father and mother are the most proper
witnesses to prove it. But it is a rule, founded in decency, morality,
and policy that they shall not be permitted to say after marriage
that they had no connection and therefore that the offspring is
spurious. 6
This rule was first introduced in Pennsylvania in the case of Com-
monwealth v. Strickler.7 Ever since the adoption of the non-access rule,
also referred to as the Lord Mansfield Rule, it has become well en-
trenched and the courts of the commonwealth have continued to apply
it" despite severe criticism as to its validity. 9 However, the doctrine has
not had such an impregnable existence elsewhere.
3. Commonwealth v. Shepard, 6 Binn. 283 (Pa. 1814); Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420,
422 (1857): "Where a child is begotten and born whilst its mother is a married woman,
its legitimacy is presumed until the contrary is made to appear." See 57 A.L.R.2d 729
(1958).
4. Cairgle v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 366 Pa. 249, 255,
256, 77 A.2d 439, 442 (1951).
5. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
6. Id. at 1258.
7. 1 Bro. App. xlvii (Pa. 1801).
S. See Bell, Competency of a Husband and Wife to Testify as to Non-Access, 21
TEMP. L.Q. 217, 218 (1947).
9. J. WiGmoRE, A TREATIsTE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE AT COMMON
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A number of jurisdictions which have subjected the rule to a- critical
examination have rejected it on the grounds that its original purpose;
which was to prevent the harsh social stigma of illegitimacy, no longer
justifies its application. This rejection has been accomplished through
legislative enactments which abrogate the rule10 and by judicial deci-
sions." In fact, two states permit the wife to testify as to non-access but
not her husband 2 while one jurisdiction only allows the husband to
testify.'3 Illustrative of the dissatisfaction with the Lord Mansfield Rule
is the attitude expressed by the Supreme Court of Maine. In holding
that a husband and wife can testify as to non-access, the court stated:
The manifest inconsistencies which have defied resolution by
those courts which have thus far followed the rule demonstrate
fully that it has persisted overlong . . . [w]here blind adherence
to an illogical doctrine can result only in the "suppression of the
truth and the defeat of justice," we are constrained to reconsider
and abolish the rule.' 4
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas has said:
In our opinion, the so-called Lord Mansfield Rule is artificial
and unsound. Being so it should neither be used to suppress the
truth nor to prevent substantial justice.' 5
Despite the logical approach of these decisions, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court believes that the continuous application of the rule
is too overwhelming for the court to overrule the doctrine. It is the
opinion of the court that the rule that a child cannot be bastardized
by the testimony of a husband and wife as to non-access is still the
standard to be applied in all cases.
LAW, § 2064 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore criticizes the rule on the grounds that the
reason for the rule, namely the protection of decency and morality is no longer relevant,
since all other testimony of the mother can be admitted even though the child will be
bastardized.
.10. Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 241 A.2d 682 (1968): Vasquez v. Esquihil, 141 Colo.
5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959); In re Kressler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956); Peters
v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951); In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 Wash. 759,
189 P.2d 458 (1948); In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933); Loudon v.
Loudon, 114 N.J. 242, 168 A. 840 (1933); State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 533, 233 N.W. 300
(1930); Evans v. State, 165 Ind. 369, 75 N.E. 651 (1905). See also 60 A.L.R. 380 (1929), 68
A.L.R. 421 (1930), and 89 A.L.R. 911 (1934).
11. Gibbons v. Maryland Casualty Company, 114 Ga. 788, 152 S.E.2d 815 (1966);
Yerian v. Brinker, 35 N.E.2d (Ohio Ct. App.) 878 (1941); Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383,
172 So. 317 (1937); State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945). See, also, 60 A.L.R.
380 (1929), 68 A.L.R. 421 (1930) and 89 A.L.R. 911 (1934).
12. Bariuan v. Bariuan, 186 Kan. 605, 352 P.2d 29 (1960); People v. Dile, 347 111. 23,
179 N.E. 93 (1931).
13. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944).
14. Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104, 108 (1963).
15. Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 P. 682, 684 (1926).
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The supreme court in the Leider case cited Cairgle'6 as the authority
for the Lord Mansfield Rule. In Cairgle, the plaintiff's husband was an
employee of the defendant. The plaintiff and her husband were sepa-
rated in 1932 and the plaintiff commenced living with another man
in 1936. During the interval to 1948, the plaintiff gave birth to three
children and upon the death of her husband she filed a claim with
the Workmen's Compensation Board for benefits for herself as a widow
and for her three children. The supreme court in reviewing noted that
the plaintiff had lived with the other man since her separation, that
the three children born to the plaintiff were given the name of her
paramour and that he had always supported them, and found the evi-
dence sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
It is readily discernible that the facts of Cairgle are similar to those
of the Leider case. In both cases there is a marriage, a separation of the
spouses, an extramarital relationship, birth of children, and finally a
termination of the marriage (by divorce in Leider and by death in
Cairgle).
If the evidence which the Cairgle court considered sufficient to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy is excluded, it would seem likely that
the court would have applied Lord Mansfield's Rule. The rationale of
the Cairgle court began with the creation of the presumption of le-
gitimacy. It was only after recognition of the presumption that the
court considered what evidence would be sufficient to overcome the
presumption. In the Cairgle analysis, the court reaffirmed the Lord
Mansfield Rule and concluded that the presumption of legitimacy
could not be overcome by the testimony of the husband and wife as
to non-access. If the court's approach is logically followed, it is im-
probable that it could have avoided application of the rule even if the
plaintiff had subsequently married her paramour.
However, in attempting to avoid the harsh and unjust result which
application of the Lord Mansfield Rule would have created under the
factual circumstances, the Leider court relied upon the subsequent
marriage of the prosecutrix and the defendant Leider. In all prob-
ability, this would not have prevented the Cairgle court from reaching
an opposite decision. If the Leider court would have followed the
rationale of the Cairgle court, the prosecutrix and her former husband
would have been prohibited from testifying as to non-access. With this
16. See note 4 supra.
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evidence excluded, it is improbable that the presumption of legitimacy
could have been overcome. The remainder of the evidence, that three
neighbors never saw the prosecutrix's husband at her house and the
testimony of two of her other children that her husband never spent
any nights with their mother, is anything but conclusive. When con-
sidering the standard that the evidence must be "clear, direct, satisfac-
tory, and irrefragable"'1 to overcome the presumption of legitimacy,
it is difficult to conceive how one could find this evidence sufficient.
With the non-access rule applied and the presumption unrebutted,
the court could only have concluded that the child born to the prose-
cutrix was that of her former husband.
The supreme court, however, did not confront itself with that choice.
Rather, the court applied the legitimation by subsequent marriage
statute:
In any and every case where the father and mother of an ille-
gitimate child or children shall ever enter into the bonds of lawful
wedlock and cohabit, such child or children shall thereby become
legitimated, and enjoy all the rights and privileges as if they had
been born during the wedlock of their parents.' 8
The court believed that the legal basis of the Lord Mansfield Rule
lies in the public policy against the bastardizing of one's own issue.
Since Leider subsequently married the prosecutrix, the child would be
legitimized by operation of law. Therefore, the testimony of the prose-
cutrix as to non-access could be admitted. With the reason for the
Lord Mansfield Rule safeguarded by application of the statute, the
court avoided a consideration of the rule.
If the court could not have created this logical exception, it would
have been necessary to apply the Lord Mansfield Rule. It is submitted
that in the application of the rule the court would have been forced
to consider the validity of the rule in light of the extensive criticism
levelled against it.
While the plight of the bastard nearly two centuries ago might have
warranted the protection afforded him by Lord Mansfield the legal
status of the illegitimate has substantially improved during this time
interval. In Pennsylvania, the bastard is not only considered the heir
of his mother for inheritance purposes,19 but with the subsequent mar-
17. See note 1 supra.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 167 (1857).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.7(A) (1947).
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riage of his parents the illegitimate is regarded an heir of both his
parents. 20 Legislation has also been enacted which regards all children
born during a void marriage as legitimate.2' These statutes exemplify
the enlightened attitude in which the illegitimate is being held. With
the dissipation of the prejudices which formerly foreshadowed the very
existence of the bastard, the question arise as to the necessity for the
non-access rule.
The Leider court admitted the arbitrary character of the doctrine.
It said:
Therefore, since the child will not be bastardized by the testi-
mony of the mother and her then husband, the rule does not
prohibit their testifying to non-access. The facts established in
the record surrounding the birth of the child underscore the
artificial result reached in the case if the rule is rigidly applied.22
(Emphasis added.)
However, the court sustained the rule on the basis of its long-stand-
ing history as the law of the commonwealth. It is submitted that to
prevent a husband and wife from testifying as to non-access is opposed
to the very basis on which our judicial system rests. If the courts pre-
clude the testimony of the husband and wife, how is it possible to
consider all of the factors and reach a result which is consistent with
justice? Who is in a better position to know if there has been access
than the husband and wife? While the argument might be raised that
the interests of the parties might taint their testimony, their credibility
will continue to be weighed by the jury.
The social and legal changes which have been effectuated since the
enunciation of the Lord Mansfield Rule marks its existence in Penn-
sylvania. In the next instance of review, the persuasive arguments
which have been aimed against the Lord Mansfield Rule will constrain
the court from creating another exception to the doctrine and in the
words of Justice Roberts find: "[t]hat the rule proscribing a husband
and wife from testifying as to non-access is an anachronism and that
the time for completely abandoning this rule has arrived.12 3
Dennis E. McArdle
20. Id. § 1.7(B) (1947).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1959).
22. 434 Pa. 293, 296, 254 A.2d 306, 308 (1968).
23. Id. at 299, 254 A.2d at 309.
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